several projects to strengthen the EMS, to improve economic policy convergence and the position of the ECU. The other main objective for Padoa-Schioppa was the strengthening of DG II's analytical capacity, especially its model-building capacity and its links with the academic world. As such, he played a crucial role in the professionalisation of economics at the Commission and in preparing DG II for the important role it would play in the EMU process. At the Commission, Padoa-Schioppa became also immersed in several European networks. Of crucial importance here were his contacts with Jacques Delors. This would be of major importance for his further career, becoming one of the architects of the single currency.
INTRODUCTION
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (1940-2010) was a convinced European federalist. He was one of the great architects of the euro, the single currency. He is especially known as a co-rapporteur of the Delors Committee (1988 and as a founding member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (1998 Bank ( -2005 .
According to Jacques Delors, a close friend, action based on an exceptionally wide and rich analysis was typical for Padoa-Schioppa, "La pensée et l'action. Telle est la réflexion première qui me vient à l'esprit lorsque j'évoque Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. La pensée est assise sur une culture exceptionnelle allant de l'histoire à l'économie, sans oublier la science politique et donc l'art de gouverner et les exigences démocratiques" 1 (Delors, 2011, 174) . 2 Padoa-Schioppa was an economist by training. And while he always maintained strong links with the academic world, he was essentially a very influential policy-maker. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, his successor in the Executive Board of the ECB, described Padoa-Schioppa's very rich and eclectic style of economics thus: "Tommaso defined himself as a 'practioner', a policy-maker, but his action was always deeply and unambiguously grounded in economic thought. … he shared Keynes' view that practical men are often slaves of some defunct economist. Even in his early years as an economist, he identified those risks of enslavement and then sought to free himself from them by way of his life-long policy engagement: the dichotomy between general economic equilibrium theory and monetary theory; the dichotomy between Nationalökonomie and international economy; and the dichotomy between economic theory and institutions. He always aspired to bring these dichotomies to an end, by properly integrating the monetary, international and institutional dimensions into his assessment of economic policy" (Bini- Smaghi, 2011) .
At the core of Padoa-Schioppa's thinking was the importance of institutions. As emphasised by Visco (2011, 2) , "Institutions and their design indeed constituted a leitmotif in his thinking, whether in connection with central banking, market infrastructures, 1 "Thought and action. Those are the first things that spring to mind when I recall Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. The thought is based on an exceptional culture ranging from history to economics, not to mention political science and thus the art of governance and democratic requirements.". 2 Padoa-Schioppa would also become President of "Notre Europe" which was founded by Delors in 1996. European integration or global monetary arrangements. He always stressed the need to clearly identify the nature and scope of the public good needed to be provided in order to design the most suitable set of rules and institutional framework case by case. At the same time, he had a dynamic view of issues and institutions: only by looking at underlying economic trends could one predict which new demands would drive the evolution of institutions in the future ... A fundamental insight of his -from early on in his career as an economist and, let me add, as a political scientist -was that growing economic and financial integration and interdependence, both in Europe and at the global level, would inevitably require a profound rethinking not only of how to allocate policy-making responsibilities but of the very concept of national sovereignty. He certainly did not underestimate the difficulty of this process or the resistance it would meet." The importance of institutions went also along with Padoa-Schioppa's approach of taking a long-term perspective, grounded in history and culture, but also very much forward looking. It was an approach he shared very much with Jacques Delors.
A crucial moment in the career of Padoa-Schioppa was his time as a Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission, from June 1979 to March 1983. This period will be very much at the centre of this paper. We first go into the formation of Padoa-Schioppa and the situation of the European Community at the end of the 1970s. Thereafter, we focus on his activities at the Commission as Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The last section analyses the later career of Padoa-Schioppa as an architect of EMU. 
THE FORMATION OF TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA
Tommaso
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT THE END OF THE 1970S
The period from 1979 to 1983, when Padoa-Schioppa was Director-General of DG II, was not an easy period for the European Community. The European economy was coping with stagflation, after the oil shocks of the 1970s, while the European integration process was languishing. Moreover, Europe's growth performance in the mid 1980s was lagging behind the United States (see also Chart 1). It was a period which was known as "Eurosclerosis". In his own "General Report" on the activities of DG II during his time at the Commission, Padoa-Schioppa (1983) himself gave a vivid description of the period, emphasising the return of national sovereignty, "La communauté, quant aux objectifs ultimes que lui ont assignés ses fondateurs, est sur la défensive depuis plusieurs années. Malgré les progrès réalisés, la simple affirmation des objectifs politiques ultimes n'est généralement tolérée que si elle prend la forme d'un appel rhétorique. L'intangibilité de la souveraineté nationale est redevenue un dogme. Ce dogme paralyse la Communauté dans sa vocation à la dynamique. Cette paralysie déforme la Communauté. Cette déformation est à son tour invoquée comme un argument supplémentaire contre le 'vieux' projet de l'intégration politique 3 ". Padoa-Schioppa (1983, 4). He further described how the Commission had lost its driving role in the process of European integration, "De la dynamique communautaire, la Commission a été conçue comme le moteur. En réalité, dans cette fonction, la Commission est un organisme gravement touché par le tournant de la deuxième moitié des années '60. Depuis, dans la plupart des cas, lorsque mouvement il y a eu, le moteur en était ailleurs: le Conseil européen, le duo Giscard-Schmidt, etc. La Commission est paralysée 4 " (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 5) 5 .
Chart 1: Economic growth in the European Union and the United States
In the second half of the 1970s, there were two important advances in European integration, albeit of a very different nature: the first direct elections for the European Parliament and the establishment of the European Monetary System, both in 1979.
The European Monetary System was very much an initiative of the French president Giscard d'Estaing and the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Ludlow, 1982) . The EMS was launched against a backdrop of considerable scepticism, especially from academic economists but also from monetary experts who still had vivid memories of the "snake" unravelling. However, political leaders pushed strongly for the EMS and succeeded in getting it off the ground. The EMS was thus a "victory of political intuition over expert opinion" (Mortensen, 1990, 28 ).
According to the 1978 Council Resolution, the European Monetary System was a "scheme for the creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary stability in Europe". Monetary stability, the objective of the EMS, had a double dimension: internal and external. This was a compromise and synthesis between the ideas of the "monetarists", led by France, emphasising the importance of external stability (exchange rate stability) and of the "economists", led by Germany, advocating internal stability (price stability) and the coordination of economic policy (Maes, 2002) .
3 "As for the end goals assigned to it by its founding fathers, the Community has been on the defensive for several years now. Despite the progress that has been made, the simple statement of the ultimate political objectives is generally only tolerated if it takes the form of a rhetorical appeal. The inviolability of national sovereignty has become a dogma once again and this dogma is paralysing the Community in its vocation as a dynamic force. This paralysis is distorting the Community. This distortion is in turn cited as another argument against the 'old' political integration project." 4 "The Commision was designed to be the driving force behind the dynamics of the European Community. In reality, in this role, the Commission is an institution seriously affected by the turning point in the second half of the 1960s. Since then, in most cases, when there has been some movement, the driving force behind it was somewhere else: the European Council, the Giscard-Schmidt tandem, etc. The Commission is paralysed.". 5 One might argue that these were rather pessimistic remarks. Later on, the Delors Commission was a clear counter-example.
The European Monetary System was composed of three main elements: the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), credit mechanisms and the European Currency Unit (or ECU).
At the core of the European Monetary System was the exchange rate mechanism. This may seem somewhat paradoxical, since not all currencies in the European Community participated. The original members were the German mark, the Dutch guilder, the French franc, the Danish krone, the Belgian/Luxembourg franc, the Irish pound and the Italian lira.
The British pound did not join.
To bolster the credibility of the exchange rate mechanism, several credit mechanisms were foreseen: very short-term, short-term and medium-term, as well as the Community loan mechanism. While the first two were central bank financing for currency support, the latter two offered balance of payments assistance linked to policy adjustment programmes.
The EMS also established the ECU. It was a basket currency comprising the currencies of the European Community Member States, including those currencies that did not participate in the exchange rate mechanism. The original aim was for the ECU to play a key role in the functioning of the ERM, both as an indicator of the source of tension in the foreign exchange markets and as a means of settling central bank debts arising from currency support operations. However, the first element never materialised, as, like in the snake, the parity grid became the indicator of tensions on the foreign exchange markets.
The second element, the ECU as a means of settling central bank debts, remained subject to restrictions. Instead, the ECU took on a significant role in the international financial markets, thanks also to the Commission's efforts. It was an important project for Padoa-Schioppa.
The EMS agreement also specified a second institutional phase, with the creation of a European Monetary Fund, within two years of the start of the EMS. However, the functions of this Fund were never really agreed upon, and the plans were shelved in December 1980. 
TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF DG II

ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Macroeconomic policy-making in the European Community was mainly at the level of the Member States and so the responsibilities of the Commission 10 were rather limited. It is 6 The start was foreseen for 1 January, but was delayed due to disagreements on the impact of the EMS on the Common Agricultural Policy. 7 He was known for being very strict on the time accorded for an appointment, for instance, from 19h20 to 19h28. 8 "Its start-up in 1979, its smooth functioning thereafter, its expansion in 1982 constituted the priority of priorities, and I devoted a great deal of my time to that. But this field also covers the spectacular development of the private ECU, attempts to improve international monetary cooperation and to advance European financial integration. If I had to put my time at DG II into one sole category, I would choose the EMS.". 9 Padoa-Schioppa (1985) contains the main articles which he wrote during his time at the Commission. 10 It can be useful to note that the term "Commission" is used both for the College of the Commission, the body of Commissioners, and for the services of the commission, the administration. Also, every Member of the Commission disposes of a small group of collaborators, his so-called "cabinet".
the College of Commissioners which is ultimately responsible for policy-making at the trade unions and considered a dialogue between the social partners (trade unions and employers) as a crucial element of its strategy to stimulate growth and employment.
German economists generally tended to emphasise that economic policy consisted in the application of certain basic economic principles (especially the respect of market mechanisms and wage moderation) to the actual policy challenges. It has certain similarities with Roy Harrod's characterisation of Keynes's view: "Following Marshall, he (= Keynes) believed... that progress in economics would be in the application of theory to practical problems. His recipe for the young economist was to know his Marshall thoroughly and read his Times every day carefully, without bothering too much about the large mass of contemporary publication in book form" (Harrod, 1951, 381 ).
Initially, French economic ideas were very influential at the Commission. Robert Marjolin, the first Commissioner for DG II, had been the principal assistant to Monnet at the French Planning Office, famous for its five-year plans (Marjolin, 1986) . The French Planning
Office, while being part of the French "Colbertist" tradition, was also a spearhead of Keynesianism in France, with the national accounts at its heart (Rosanvallon, 1987, 40) .
Later, Malinvaud was influential, especially with his distinction between "Keynesian" and "classical" unemployment (Malinvaud, 1977) . 
THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EMS
Padoa-Schioppa's first priority in monetary matters was to avoid the EMS becoming a repetition of the snake, which was characterised not only by realignments, but also by several countries leaving. Moreover, decisions about this were very much national decisions, not Community decisions. Furthermore, the snake did not really contribute to policy convergence.
Another crucial priority for Padoa-Schioppa was to strengthen the Commission's position in the management of the EMS, which was largely in the hands of the central banks 12 . He therefore reinforced the Monetary Directorate of DG II. He created an EMS desk, so that the Commission had the necessary information on the functioning of the EMS. DG II also developed a "Manual" with all the procedures and timing for a realignment. Over time, the realignments in the EMS became more collective decisions.
Padoa-Schioppa (1985) tells the story of the first realignments: "The first one took place in 12 For an analysis of how the Commission tried to increase its role in monetary matters in the 1960s (and its relations with the central banks), see Maes, 2006. September 1979, less than six months after the System had started. what can be called the hegemonic method was abandoned after the first realignment and the unilateral method typical of Bretton Woods after the third. Since then, all the realignments haven been made properly, in the sense that on each occasion there was a meeting at the Community level, with the realignment being decided only after all the member countries had had an opportunity to propose a change in parities alternative to that asked for by the applicant country".
In the autumn of 1979, Padoa-Schioppa was also very much involved in Commission proposals to strengthen economic policy coordination 13 16 .
In the following months, the Commission's proposal was analysed by the central banks. At the January 1980 meeting, the Governors' alternates reported on their discussions: "les Suppléants sont d'avis que les consultations préalables sur les politiques monétaires sont souhaitables mais qu'en pratique elles peuvent être difficiles, voire impossibles, étant donné la variété, au sein de la CEE, des procédures et des structures qui sont mises en jeu pour prendre les décisions. … Toutefois, quelques Suppléants ont souligné que la politique monétaire étant définie dans la plupart des pays en termes d'objectifs quantitatifs 14 "Mr. Ortoli points out that, in carrying out its mandate to look into ways of improving coordination of economic policies, the Commission is shortly planning to present the Council of Ministers with a document that will suggest a much more precise procedure than that used at the moment for major domestic decisions on monetary policy and, in particular, interest rate policies. This procedure, which would affect the way the Committees work, is inspired by the fact that monetary policy decisions, especially in the case of a large country, are not without influence on the internal development of the EMS and that, consequently, such decisions should be submitted to prior high-level consultation... In that way, while respecting national responsibility for monetary policy, Community concerns would be increasingly taken into account, something which is essential, because, without better coordination of monetary policies, the operation of the EMS would be jeopardised.". 15 "Mr. Emminger notes that there is a tendency to emphasise only the German monetary policy measures, while saying nothing about the fact that other Community authorities have also taken measures in recent months without prior consultation". 16 It is noteworthy that, from June 1979 onwards, Ortoli became more active in the meetings of the Committee of Governors. officiels, des consultations préalables pourraient avoir lieu sur la fixation des objectifs 17 The early 1980s were a difficult time for the EMS, with tensions on the foreign exchange markets and several currency realignments (see Table 1 ). In order to stabilise the EMS, As mentioned earlier, the EMS agreement also specified a second institutional phase, involving the establishment of a European Monetary Fund within two years of the start of 19 Ortoli and Delors had very good contacts. They had worked closely together in the mid-1970s, when they were both at the French Planning Office (Badel and Bussière, 2011) Padoa-Schioppa then sought other ways to strengthen the EMS. These efforts culminated in the European Commission's March 1982 proposals for a "non-institutional" development of the EMS. There were several rather technical, ideas. A first element was to strengthen the position of the ECU and the exchange rate mechanism, for instance by increasing the negotiability of the ECU, by expanding the use of Community currencies for 20 "There are many reasons for that: the second oil shock, the new wave of inflation that came after it, the dollar soaring, and the centrifugal tensions following these developments. But the main reason has, generally speaking, been the mistrust displayed deep down, and sometimes even in public, by the monetary authorities of the country with the strongest currency. The anti-EMS sentiment of a public that was already not exactly in favour of the system was even encouraged by the authority in charge of its management". 21 "This attitude changed when, in May 1982, the very existence of the system was in danger. By then, it was generally recognised that the stakes were primarily economic and commercial, before monetary, and that the EMS had never really weakened the defence of monetary stability. It was too late to bring the 'deepening' initiative to a successful conclusion. It is thanks to the wisdom of France and the system's other member countries that German scepticism has not been fatal". intra-marginal interventions and by coordinating relations vis-à-vis the dollar. Secondly, the Commission proposed to open up the system to the outside world by permitting thirdcountry monetary authorities to hold and use ECUs. Thirdly, there was a chapter on encouraging the use of the ECU on the financial markets, for instance, by increasing the ECU borrowing and lending activity of Community institutions and by keeping restrictions on the use of the EEC's basket currency to a minimum. It was to become a cherished topic for Padoa-Schioppa. A fourth dimension was a reinforcement of policy convergence, stressing full use of the existing framework and improving follow-up measures.
But the Commission not only proposed technical improvements for the EMS, it also drew up proposals with a more political content. These focused on the full participation of all currencies in the exchange rate mechanism and the issue of an ECU coin. Of crucial importance for the Commission was the participation of all EU currencies. As stressed by the Commission, "The European Monetary System will not assume its full significance and will not achieve its full potential until it organizes, on an equal footing, the exchange rate relationships of all the Community currencies: sterling's, and later the drachma's, participation in the exchange rate mechanism (and the narrowing to 2.25 % of the Italian lira's present margins) would bring the system to full fruition and would act as a signal to the markets and to public opinion of the determination to pursue in common the attempt -accepted and recognized by all -to establish a zone of monetary stability in Europe" (CEC, 1982, 52). The Commission further defended the idea of an ECU coin, which would circulate freely throughout the Community. This should strike public opinion by "bringing the ECU out of the specialists' circle (central banks, exchange dealers, capital market operators) to which it is now confined, and putting it in the pocket of the man in the street, the ECU's destiny as the monetary symbol of the Community would be fully affirmed" (CEC, 1982, 52).
Padoa-Schioppa was known for always taking a long-term perspective. One of the issues which he was also aiming for was progress in financial integration (which had dropped out of the monetary discussions in the 1970s, cf. Maes, 2007) . Padoa-Schioppa also began to focus closely on the long-term consequences of a stable EMS and financial integration. In a lecture in Milan in June 1982, he coined his famous "inconsistent quartet" saying, the impossibility of reconciling (1) free trade, (2) full capital mobility, (3) fixed (or at any rate managed) exchange rates and (4) national autonomy of monetary policy. As Padoa-Schioppa (1982) observed, he was enlarging the "inconsistent trinity" of international monetary theory: "The incompatibility between fixed exchange rates, free capital movements, and independent national monetary policies has been referred to in economic literature as the 'inconsistent trinity'. I have turned this trio into the 'inconsistent quartet' by adding a fourth element, free trade, which is a pillar of the Treaty of Rome and an aspect which cannot simply be taken for granted in our present economic What is important is that they show that there is considerable potential for an international currency used by private agents, and that the development of this potential only requires a very small legal, and one could say 'official', platform" 22 .
In his "General Report" of February 1983, Padoa-Schioppa gave a mixed picture of the situation of the EMS at the time of his departure from the Commission. There was important progress, but there were also significant shortcomings, "Le SME s'est sensiblement renforcé par l'obtention, petit à petit, de deux résultats importants qui n'étaient pas acquis d'avance: i) les modifications de parités sont véritablement devenues des décisions collectives, beaucoup plus que ce n'était le cas dans le système de Bretton Woods; ii) il est devenu de règle que les changements de parités soient accompagnés par des mesures de politique économique... Les approfondissements du système "dans" l'acquis sont importants, mais non irréversibles. Il faut les consolider, et une telle consolidation ne sera durable que s'il y a extension "de" l'acquis. Pour cela, nos 22 The turning point for Padoa-Schioppa was the Delors Report, which rejected the parallel currency approach.
propositions de mars 1982 ne représentaient qu'un petit pas. Le chemin vers l'union monétaire est encore long 23 " (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 13). The EMS has been considerably strengthened by gradually obtaining two important results that were not acquired in advance: i) parity adjustments have genuinely become collective decisions, much more than was the case under the Bretton Woods system; ii) it has become standard for changes in exchange rates to be accompanied by economic policy measures... Moves to deepen the system within the acquis are important but not irreversible. They need to be consolidated and such consolidation would only be lasting if the acquis itself were to be extended. For that, our March 1982 proposals were only a small step forward. There is still a long road to monetary union.". 24 As also remarked by Delors, cf. Hay, 1989, 17. Marris' remarks about the OECD apply also to the European Commission: '"good economics" merges almost imperceptibly into the art of persuasion', (Marris, 1986, 113) . 25 "The real instrument is persuasion, since basic standards can never replace the quality of the argument.
STRENGTHENING THE ANALYTICAL CAPACITY OF DG II
While the action comes from others in these non-operational areas, the Commission nevertheless has two instruments at its disposal: professionalism and the possibility to tell the truth." concerted action (a newly created division, responsible for a 'horizontal' analysis of the Community economy and for policy actions at the Community level); short-term forecasts (responsible for the coordination and consistency of the forecasting exercises); business 26 "Having been a national civil servant, I knew that the Commission's analyses and standpoints on economic and monetary policy would not attract the same amount of attention and enjoy the same prestige as those from other international organisations. The Commission's documents had a reputation of being too numerous, often inaccurate, analytically poor and not very original. I have devoted a lot of my time to acting on the working methods and tools with a view to making up DG II's lost ground, and wherever possible catching up, in the field of economic analysis and policy.". 27 "A major effort has been made to raise DG II's capacity for economic analysis, by working on two elements that I would call "intelligence" and "models of excellence". By "intelligence", I mean the economic analytical capacity that comes into, or should come into, a large part of DG II's work; by "models of excellence", operations, papers, studies or publications in which a particularly high degree of quality is sought, with the objective of obtaining not just a high-quality result, which is useful in itself, but also to exert a driving force, and imitation effect, on methods to apply and results to obtain in other fields" cycle surveys (responsible for the coordination and aggregation of business and consumer surveys, which were carried out by different institutes in the individual Member States); medium-term forecasts; econometric models (a newly created division, the purpose was to give DG II more autonomy in econometric modelling, like at the Bank of Italy. This group would later be merged with the unit for medium-term forecasts).
Other reforms also contributed to the strengthening of DG II's intellectual and analytical capacities, like the organisation of seminars (both by DG II economists and outsiders) and the reinvigoration of the group of advisers (economists, both academics and national policy-makers, who were working on a temporary basis at the Commission).
Padoa-Schioppa also launched a new series of publications, called the "Economic Papers" (which were the sole responsibility of the author). This caused quite a stir in the Commission, as officials publishing in their own name in an official publication of the European Commission was a completely new phenomenon for the EEC executive.
Of particular importance was the collaboration with the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), especially with the foundation (and funding by DG II, cf. Ludlow, 1983 , 2) of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group. This Group was also known as the Dornbusch Group, after its first chairman. Padoa-Schioppa also presented a paper at the CEPS opening conference (Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia, 1983).
DG II economists would have meetings with the members of the CEPS group, in which the macroeconomic situation and the policy challenges for the European Community would be discussed. The CEPS economists would offer their comments on policy documents of the Commission, particularly the Annual Economic Report, and they would also write their own paper every year. Initially, the Dornbusch Group was set up as an internal advisory group. Later, at the behest of the academics, it was decided to publish the Dornbusch Group papers, both as a CEPS paper and as a Commission Economic
Paper.
This triangular collaboration (Dornbusch Group, Commission, CEPS) offered DG II several advantages: it strengthened the analytical and intellectual level of the economic policy debate, it allowed the Commission to penetrate into the world of the economic intelligentsia, and it exposed the services of DG II to emulation and contradiction.
Moreover, it was also a way to let top American academics get to know the European Community and to analyse Europe's economic problems.
The Dornbusch Group's Economic Papers caused quite some turmoil, especially in the cabinets but also among the Commissioners. Several people asked the question why the Commission should pay people "who make our life difficult". Senior DG II officials, like Padoa-Schioppa and Emerson, defended the principle of publishing the work of the Dornbusch Group. They argued that the cooperation with the Dornbusch Group was very important for DG II, both for improving its analytical capacity and for increasing its influence in the academic world. Consequently, one had to "accept the rules of the game" and let the Dornbusch Group publish the results of its research. Here, they had the support of Ortoli, the Member of the Commission responsible for DG II.
As mentioned earlier, in the early 1980s, the European economy was coping with severe stagflation, after the second oil shock of 1979 and high US interest rates. In its analysis, the Commission strongly emphasised the structural aspects of the crisis: "the accumulated back-log of adjustments and our growing incapacity to respond quickly to the recent changes in the economic environment. The increased structural rigidities in our economies and social behaviour have changed profoundly the long-term dynamics of the business cycle" (CEC, 1982, 11) . In its analysis of the unemployment problem, the Commission strongly emphasised that economic growth had become less labour-intensive. According to its own estimates, the stock of capital per employed person had risen at an average annual rate of 2.5 % in the preceding decade (CEC, 1984, 24) . The rise in relative labour costs, which was at the origin of this capital deepening, was not only the consequence of increases in nominal wages but also of the rise of non-wage labour costs. Substitution was further stimulated as the cost of capital was kept low, partly due to fiscal advantages. For the Commission, the increase in public expenditure, as well as the structure of expenditure and taxes, were among the causes of rising unemployment.
Another reason for the increase in classical unemployment, according to the Commission, were the growing rigidities in the labour markets in Europe. They were the result both of legislation and of collective bargaining agreements. These were generally introduced in the golden sixties, in order to protect weaker groups. However, the Commission noted that: "Some of these regulations have proved to be ill-adapted to new circumstances and may ... have hindered employment creation" (CEC, 1984, 33) . The "concerted action", after the European Summit in Bremen and the G7 Summit in Bonn in 1979, led to an increase in inflation and balance-of-payments deficits in the early 1980s (Maes, 1998, 404) . It led European Commission officials to focus on the supply side, especially the increased rigidities in Europe's labour markets. These rigidities certainly distinguished Europe from the United States with its flexible markets.
THE LATER CAREER OF PADOA-SCHIOPPA AS AN ARCHITECT OF EMU
For Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, becoming Director-General of DG II was a defining moment in his career and his life. He became immersed in several European networks, which would be of enormous importance for his further career. ... The thing that all these men had in common was that, whatever the difficulties of European integration, they never lost heart. They drew inspiration from the Treaty's founding fathers and, in the same spirit, always tried to find solutions. This sentiment of enthusiasm that they had in them was impressive." du marché -qui allait prendre encore plus d'importance -et la régulation, avec ses the balance between the market function -that was going to become much more important -and regulation, with its accompanying and corrective policies. ... As I usually do in all the initiatives that I take, I was anxious to justify it by both intellectual and theoretical reasoning. Chance had it that Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, who was Director at the Banca d'Italia at the time, after having been Director-General at the Commission, came to see me to talk about precisely this equilibrium. During the course of the conversation, he reminded me -which was highly enlightening -of the three economic functions singled out by the economist Richard Musgrave, resource allocation, stabilisation, redistribution. I, for my part, called for an in-depth reflection that would back up the approach we were starting out from. Then I immediately went on to set up a working group christened "Efficiency, Stability, and Equity" which Padoa Schioppa was to chair and which, in 1988, served to justify this theory of equilibrium between market and regulation. ... I wanted this highly useful report to be published as a book. You only have to look at its main chapters: Towards a balanced development of the economic system of the Community, The Internal Market, Capital mobility, The macro-economic stabilisation function, The redistribution function and the Community budget, The conditions for growth." Padoa-Schioppa emphasised, professionalism and "telling the truth" are probably the best ways that international institutions can contribute to strong and sustainable economic policies and performances. The professionalisation of DGII, together with the strengthening of the Monetary Directorate, were furthermore essential elements to prepare DG II for the important role it would play in the EMU process, also intellectually (for instance with the study "One Market, One Money", CEC, 1990). As such this is also a beautiful illustration of Padoa-Schioppa's emphasis on the importance of strong institutions, also in the process of European integration.
At the Commission, Padoa-Schioppa became further immersed in several European networks. Of crucial importance here were his contacts with Jacques Delors. This would be of enormous importance for his further career, becoming one of the architects of the single currency. However, he was also among the first to warn of the dangers of "a currency without a State".
